Authored by Grant Newsham via RealClearDefense,
Chinese leader, Xi Jinping has made it clear that he is determined to acquire Taiwan – by any means necessary.
He has his reasons.
This move would solidify Xi’s place among the immortals by achieving something that even Mao Tse Tung couldn’t accomplish. By taking control of Taiwan, China would break through the first island-chain – a series of island nations from Japan to Taiwan, and extending to the Philippines and Malaysia – that currently restrict China’s access to the Pacific and beyond. Breaking this chain would provide the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with easier access to the Pacific, potentially allowing them to encircle Japan, isolate Australia, and advance further.
These benefits extend beyond operational advantages.
Equally significant are the political and psychological implications. An acquisition of Taiwan would demonstrate that the U.S. military was unable to protect the 23 million inhabitants of Taiwan. Neither economic nor financial pressures from the United States were successful in deterring China. Additionally, even U.S. nuclear capabilities were ineffective in preventing China’s actions.
This shift in power dynamics would prompt many Asian capitals to reassess their positions and potentially align with China to avoid facing Chinese pressure alone. The United States’ influence in the Pacific would diminish, and global trust in U.S. security assurances, whether explicit or implicit, would erode.
Is China Ready to Take Taiwan?
The recently published 2024 DOD China Military Power Report paints a concerning picture of China’s rapidly advancing military capabilities.
However, the report suggests that while Taiwan remains a primary target, the Chinese military may not be fully prepared for an operation against the island at this time.
Despite the progress made by the PLA, it seems that they are never quite ready to initiate an attack on Taiwan.
Experts on China can list numerous reasons why a Chinese assault on Taiwan may not be imminent.
Here is a breakdown of the reasons, along with a critical examination of their validity.
1. There are only two optimal windows during the year (April and October) when weather conditions are suitable for an invasion force to cross the Taiwan Strait.
However, as noted by a Taiwanese oceanographer, ferry services operate year-round, suggesting that weather conditions may not be as limiting as perceived. Historical military operations have demonstrated the ability to overcome adverse weather conditions.
2. Only a limited number of narrow beaches on Taiwan’s west coast are suitable for an amphibious landing.
Amphibious operations can be successful even with minimal beach access, especially if the defending forces are weakened or deceived. Historical examples, such as the U.S. Marines’ operation at Tinian in 1944, showcase the effectiveness of amphibious assaults.
3. PLA needs to secure a port — a challenging task given potential defenses and lack of strategic planning.
China’s construction of specialized barges for potential landings, combined with innovative strategies, could address the port acquisition challenge.
4. PLA lacks adequate naval transport capacity for troop and equipment transfer across the strait.
Reevaluating the available transport assets, including civilian vessels, reveals sufficient capacity for troop deployment, especially with the integration of military-civil fusion resources.
5. Amphibious operations rank among the most complex military maneuvers.
Dismissing China’s capabilities based on assumptions of inferiority may underestimate their competency, as evidenced by historical amphibious operations.
6. PLA faces challenges in coordinating joint operations.
Recent exercises and training efforts indicate progress in enhancing joint operational capabilities, suggesting that the PLA is actively improving in this area.
7. PLA struggles with ‘joint logistics over-the-shore’ operations.
Underestimating China’s logistical capabilities based on preconceived notions of inadequacy may overlook substantial advancements in this area.
8. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) possesses aircraft carriers, but their effectiveness is questioned.
China’s aircraft carrier capabilities, when integrated with other military branches, present a formidable force within the First Island Chain, potentially challenging regional powers.
9. PLA lacks combat experience.
Comparing combat experience between the PLA and other military forces may reveal similar gaps, suggesting that combat readiness is not solely determined by past engagements.
10. The PLA is plagued by corruption.
Addressing corruption concerns within the PLA may overlook the force’s operational readiness and strategic advancements, as highlighted by recent military developments.
11. Xi Jinping’s leadership faces distrust from military officials.
Historical examples of successful military campaigns under centralized leadership demonstrate the potential for cohesive decision-making and execution.
12. PLA officers resist Xi’s authority.
Speculations on internal dissent within the PLA may not accurately reflect the force’s cohesion and loyalty, especially in times of strategic significance.
13. China’s innovation capabilities are doubted.
China’s demonstrated advancements in military technology and strategy challenge assumptions of limited innovation, emphasizing the country’s capacity for technological progress.
14. PLA personnel lack initiative.
Assumptions about PLA personnel’s initiative may discount the force’s adaptability and strategic acumen, potentially underestimating their operational effectiveness.
15. China’s timing for attacking Taiwan remains uncertain.
Speculating on attack timelines may overlook China’s strategic flexibility and the potential for unexpected military actions, emphasizing the need for readiness and vigilance.
16. China faces social challenges in initiating conflict.
Addressing potential social repercussions of military actions may overlook China’s capacity for strategic messaging and internal control, highlighting the multifaceted considerations in conflict decision-making.
17. Economic consequences of conflict are deemed prohibitive.
Evaluating economic costs of conflict may neglect China’s long-term strategic objectives and the potential benefits of regional dominance, emphasizing the complex interplay between economic and security considerations.
18. China’s global reputation concerns are dismissed.
Downplaying reputational risks may overlook China’s strategic objectives and messaging priorities, highlighting the importance of comprehensive assessments of China’s motivations and capabilities.
19. Taiwan’s reserve forces are viewed as a deterrent.
Reevaluating the readiness and effectiveness of Taiwan’s reserve forces may reveal nuanced considerations in conflict scenarios, emphasizing the multifaceted nature of military deterrence.
20. Taiwan’s defense capabilities are underestimated.
Assessing Taiwan’s defense readiness may overlook the potential for external support and strategic partnerships, highlighting the dynamic nature of military alliances.
21. Taiwan’s geographic challenges are seen as insurmountable.
Examining Taiwan’s terrain challenges may reveal opportunities for strategic adaptation and operational innovation, emphasizing the importance of flexible military planning.
22. Urban combat in Taiwan presents significant obstacles.
Addressing urban combat challenges may overlook China’s operational capabilities and strategic adaptability, highlighting the need for comprehensive assessments of military scenarios.
23. China’s military hardware superiority is questioned.
Challenging assumptions about military hardware superiority may reveal evolving military technologies and strategic doctrines, emphasizing the need for continuous assessments of military capabilities.
24. Historical military challenges are compared to modern scenarios.
Reflecting on historical military campaigns may inform strategic planning and operational considerations, highlighting the importance of analyzing past experiences in contemporary conflict scenarios.
25. Comparisons are drawn to past military operations.
Examining historical military operations may inform strategic assessments and operational planning, highlighting the need for comprehensive analyses of past military campaigns.
26. External actors are considered in conflict scenarios.
Assessing potential external interventions may inform strategic planning and operational readiness, highlighting the importance of comprehensive assessments of regional security dynamics.
These considerations challenge conventional assumptions about China’s military capabilities and strategic intentions, emphasizing the need for continuous evaluation and preparedness in the face of evolving security challenges.
Grant Newsham is a retired U.S. Marine officer and senior fellow at The Center for Security Policy, The Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, and The Yorktown Institute. He is the author of When China Attacks: A Warning to America.
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