The Emergence of a New Era in Warfare
Written by Andy Thaxton via RealClearWire,
More than a decade ago, during my time focusing on force protection for Navy air logistics missions, the notion of drone attacks was just starting to gain serious attention. We deliberated on potential scenarios and hypotheticals, but these conversations were mostly in the background of mission preparations. However, over the past ten years, this threat has evolved into a primary concern in military operational strategies, introducing a novel element to modern warfare.
In the early hours of June 1, 2025, the Security Service (SBU) of Ukraine carried out Operation Spiderweb, a daring drone attack on Russian airfields that resulted in the destruction or damage of several of Russia’s most valuable aircraft, potentially including two A-50 early-warning planes and up to twelve strategic bombers. Drones, smuggled into Russia over a year and a half and concealed in remote-controlled containers, were launched from within Russian borders, catching Moscow off guard.
Merely days later, on June 13, 2025, Mossad of Israel orchestrated a similarly audacious operation, named Rising Lion, targeting Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Mossad agents, operating covertly inside Iran, established drone bases near Tehran and smuggled precision weaponry to dismantle air defenses and eliminate key individuals, such as Revolutionary Guards leaders and at least one senior nuclear scientist. It is crucial to note that these drone assaults originated from within Russia and Iran.
These events potentially signify a new phase in warfare: sophisticated, subversive infiltration by determined adversaries willing to engage in a long-term strategy.
The United States, due to years of porous borders and inadequate supervision of foreign land acquisitions, is alarmingly susceptible to such tactics, especially from strategic competitors like China, whose land purchases in close proximity to U.S. military installations pose a clear threat.
Redefining Asymmetric Warfare?
Even for those who may not closely monitor such developments, it is evident that Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb and Israel’s Rising Lion mark a shift in modern conflict paradigms. Instead of relying on traditional military might, both operations leveraged clandestine infiltration, advanced technology, and strategic patience to strike deep within enemy territories. Ukraine’s drones, assembled and hidden over months, targeted a multi-billion-dollar air fleet using low-cost, commercially adapted unmanned systems. The SBU’s operation—smuggling drones across borders and concealing them in plain sight—showcased how unconventional tactics can undermine a nation’s strategic capabilities.
Similarly, Mossad likely spent years infiltrating Iran to establish drone bases and position munitions, striking at the core of Tehran’s nuclear program and eliminating critical personnel. These operations highlight the increasing efficacy of a new form of asymmetric warfare, where smaller entities, with a touch of ingenuity, can exploit the weaknesses of larger adversaries, potentially at a fraction of the cost. Drones that cost mere thousands, or even less, can now challenge systems worth billions. Moreover, drones can be deployed in large numbers. The sight of Chinese drone light shows in online videos is truly remarkable—individual operators coordinating 10,000 or more small drones in impressive displays of precision and agility. It is not difficult to envision the innovative strategies that military planners could devise utilizing such systems.
Aside from drones being utilized in these two operations, a common element was time. Both Ukraine and Israel invested significant time in meticulous planning, capitalizing on weak internal security and insider connections. Ukraine’s drones were gradually smuggled and hidden in trucks and shipping containers. Mossad’s operatives purportedly operated under the watch of Iranian intelligence, using civilian vehicles to transport weapons and establish covert launch sites. These instances reveal a sobering reality: a patient adversary embedded within a target’s territory can strike with devastating accuracy.
Is the US at Risk?
The United States, with its lenient immigration policies in recent years and permissive rules on foreign investments, is ripe for similar subversion. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) oversees foreign land acquisitions, but its scope is limited and often fails to identify national security threats posed by strategic purchases.
A 2021 incident involving the Chinese Fufeng Group’s acquisition of 300 acres near Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota raised concerns in Congress. The base plays a crucial role in U.S. drone operations and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, making it an ideal target for espionage or sabotage. Chinese companies have also purchased or attempted to purchase land near other sensitive locations, such as Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada and Fort Bragg in North Carolina. Only recently has this activity started to garner the attention of legislators.
Separate from land acquisitions, as early as 2019, concerns were raised about Chinese container ships potentially docking in U.S. ports with concealed drone launchers onboard. These covert systems could be used to target military installations and critical infrastructure. Tom Shugart, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), recently highlighted this risk stating, “We routinely allow ships owned and operated by DoD-designated Chinese military companies to sit in our ports with thousands of containers onboard and under their control.”
China’s Strategic Patience
China’s approach mirrors the patience and subversion witnessed in Ukraine and Israel’s operations. Through the Belt and Road Initiative and an extensive global investment program, Beijing demonstrates a long-term strategy to gain strategic advantages. The FBI has highlighted the use of shell companies to obscure Chinese ownership behind acquisitions, potentially complicating oversight by CFIUS and state authorities. If unchecked, these acquisitions could provide a platform for passive intelligence collection and potential attacks.
This threat is not merely hypothetical. Security analysts are increasingly concerned about the prospect of PLA-affiliated entities utilizing assets on U.S. soil to disrupt logistics in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Drones launched from rural properties could target airfields, fuel depots, or command centers—similar to Ukraine’s SBU actions against Russia.
Addressing the Vulnerabilities
The United States must take decisive action to counter this evolving threat. Firstly, Congress should broaden CFIUS’s jurisdiction to review all foreign land acquisitions in proximity to U.S. military bases. Secondly, the Department of Homeland Security must enhance port security and intensify inspections of Chinese-flagged vessels for concealed weapons systems, as recommended by CNAS. Thirdly, the U.S. must enhance counterintelligence efforts focused on subversive foreign networks—taking inspiration from Israel’s successful intelligence practices. Lastly, individual states should continue to enact legislation limiting foreign ownership of sensitive land.
Ukraine and Israel have illustrated that patient, subversive infiltration can incapacitate formidable military forces. China, through strategic land acquisitions and global aspirations, is already poised to exploit America’s vulnerabilities. The question no longer revolves around what if—but when.
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